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Abstract
hot exhaust gas is then directed and expanded by the nozzle to
produce useful thr1_1st. Nuclear radiation is produced by the reactor,
however, an engine shield reduces radiation --levels to engine
components, the vehicle and the payload. (Figure 3)

Many unique problems have been encountered and overcome in the
developmental .t esting of nuclear powered engines for s .pacE'.
applications, necessitating an extensive radiological and cryogenic safety program at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station •.
(NRDS) The radiological safety program directs itself toward the
protection of personnel associated with the program and the public
from direct radiation and resultant radioactive effluent. The .
cryogenics safety program at the NRDS directs itself to the
prevention of accidents which could damage the nuclear reactor or
the test facilities and in turn endanger associated personnel.

Safety at N RDS •
Unique safety considerations at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station are nuclear safety and cryogenic safety. These are in
addition to conventional industrial safety practices.
Industrial Safety
Industrial safety at the NHDS takes on several unique facets
which we do not normally think of when we refer to a conventional
industrial safety program. In our Industrial Program at Jackass
.Flats, we must, because of the relative hazards of the work, make
it a preventative program rather than one which acts after the fact.
We cannot afford to learn from our mistakes. We must insure that
mistakes are not made to begin with. Besides dealing with the
regular day to day problems of machinery, traffic, fire protection
and training, our Industrial Safety Plan plays a strong role in
occupational and environmental health. Industrial Safety personnel
must review all plans, processes and procedures for new construction prior to the beginning of the project. In this way problems
with volatile, toxic or radioactive substances are .eliminated before
they occur.
The Industrial Safety Program must also include provisions for
assuring that all AEC and NASA contractors located at NRDS are
kept aware of new Federal codes, regulations and laws and assure,
through continual audit, that these provisions are correctly interpreted and carried out.
The Industrial Safety Program has initiated and used to great
advantage a "Near Miss" program, This program involves assuring
that all NRDS personnel are made aware of serious accidents which
"almost" occurred. The "Near Miss" hopefully acts as a stimulus
to employees to assure that dangerous conditions or at:tions will

It is graphically illustrated that nuclear rocket engines do not
present a radiological safety problem prior to operation, and ·that
during and following operation, experience has proven that control
measures are possible to minimize possible hazards. Of partic ular interest is the comparison of cryogenic and radiological
safety effects.
Introduction
The nuclear rocket (ROVER) program is a joint program of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U. S.
.\tomic Energy Commission, under the management and direction of
the joint AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. The HOVER
Program is concerned with developing the technology and systems
for using nuclear propulsion for space missions.
Space launch vehicles of today are all propelled by chemical
rockets operating on the combustion principle. The earliest source
of power providing greater performance than today's most advanced
chemical rocket engines is the nuclear rocket engine.
A new program such as nuclear rocket development causes
need !'or a new look at safety considerations. Unique among those
to iH' considered during development trsting of nuclear systrms
arr nuclear safety and cryogenic safety in addition to the more
conventional and better understood considerations of industrial
safety.
This presentation will address itself to each of these safety
topics as they are practiced at the Nuclear Rocket Uevclopmen!
Station (NRDS).
The Nuclear Rocket Development Station b the national sitr
for conducting full scale tests of nuclear rocket reactors and
engines and, eventually, complete stages in the United States'
program to develop nuclear- propelled spacecraft for deep space
flight. The station is a 90,000-acre sitr located approximately 90
miles northwest of Las V cgas, Nevada. (Figure 1) The plant value
of test facilities at the NHUS is approximately $85,000,000 and
includes two r.eactor trst cells, "A" and "C"; an enginr tr s t
stand, ETS-1; a reactor maintenanee, assembly and disassemhly
building, R-MAD; and an engine maintrnancr, assembly and
disassembly building, E-MAD. A two- position rngin<' 'stage trsl
facility is presently under design .
The basie differrnce hrtween a nuclear propul s ion system and
the more conventional chemical propulsion sysl!'m i8 in the method
of heating the propellant to provide thrust. The chemiC·al rol'kct
opcr-ates on a comhustion principle where fuel and oxidizer are
combined and burn. The resultant exhaust gases provide the thrust.
A nuclear system uses a nuclear reactor to heat an extremely cold
liquid propellant with a high expansion ratio and channel s the
resulting hot gas through a nozzle lo provide thrust. So you can
see we do not burn our propellant, we merely heat it. (Figure 2)
llasically what we have is liquid hydrogen hcing pumpPd from
a propellant tank through a super- hot rraclor, or heat exchanger,
expanded and exhausted to provide thrust. The pump is turbine
drivt'n and is run by a portion of the hot rxhaust gases bled off
upstream of the nozzle. This is tht' common "bleed cycle" that
permits the "boot-strap" start- up with which you arc probably
familiar. As the liquid hydrogen passes through the hot reactor
(approximately 4000° F.) it is heated to extreme temperature. The

be eliminated.
Industrial safety is also in.strum~ntal in establishing procedures for, and overseeing, all emergency actions which might take
place at the NRDS.
Cryogenic and Systems Safety
A eomplete and comprehensive Cryogenic and Systems Safety
Program is in effect at the NHUS. The Cryogenic Safety Program
addr!'s8es itself to th!' three major problt'ms which are associated
with handling any eryogenic fluid.
1. Extremely low temperatures reduce ductility and impact
resistance of most materials on contact.
2. Confinement results in pressure forming due to vaporization and expansion.
3. Severe tissue damage results when human tissue is contacted by the cryogenic fluid, its immediate container or resultant
cold gases.
In addition, as you know, liquid hydrogen is volatile in air,
with wide flammability limits. Very low energy is required to ignite
hydrogen. Hydrogen in its liquid state probably presents us with
our most serious concerns at the NRDS. Our storage capacity for
LH2 has grown in the past year from 586,000 gallons to 1,586,000
and our gas and cryogenic systems are rather complex as shown
by the simplified flow diagram of a test cell. (Figure 4)
Although liquid hydrogen is handled daily in large quantities
at the NRUS in a routine manner, constant awareness of new
equipment or methods in handling this material is a must. Safety
codes, based in part on the experience of organizations handling
hydrogen have been stipulated and are in practical use. These
codes have evolved from four basic factors:
1. Knowledge of the potential hazards of the fluid and its
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2. Fuels, propellants, gases and cryogenic materials, their
characteristics, hazard category, handling, storage and transportation safety features,
3. Systems environmental constraints.
4. Use of potentially explosive devices.
5. Compatibility of materials.
6. Human factors.
7. Use of pressure vessels and associated systems.
8. Documentation concerning the safe operation and mainte-

system.
2. Personnel education in both the potential hazards and
the technical aspects of the system.
3. Assurance tha l specific procedures exist and are followed
during all hydrogen operations.
4. Systems engineering to preclude hazards.
Factor 1 demands that, to be effective, safety codes must be
based on knowledge of the properties of the fluids to be handled,
the gases produced by their vaporization and of mixtures which
occur when the gases disperse into the atmosphere. The properties
of the materials used to confine the fluids and the response of the
human body to both the fluids and their resultant gases are essential considerations. These factors all evolve into the safety codes
•
now in use at the NRDS.
~actor 2 requires that all super~isory and technical personnel
workmg on a system have an intimate knowledge of equipment
arrangements, facility operations and capacities, and systems
operation. In addition, the interrelationships of all these features
must be understood so than an effective, efficient and safe day-today working operation may be realized. To assure that competent
and qualified personnel are available for potentially dangerous
operations and tests, each affected NRDS organization carries on
an extensive indoctrination and training program.
Factor 3 is primarily for use during cryogenics systems tests
and activation exercises. These tests, whether being performed in
the immediate lest area or from a remoted control point, are under
the direct control of test supervisors who have complete and upto-date procedures and checklists. One of their primary obligations
is to maintain strict lest discipline throughout all phases of the

nance of the facility.
9. Training pertaining to all of the above.
When a problem area in any one of the above categories is
defined, a sequence of action is then taken to make the system as
safe as possible. To satisfy safety engineering criteria this
sequence is in the following order of preference;

1. Design for Minimum Hazard. Every effort should be made
during all phases of design to insure optimum safety through the
selection of appropriate design features and qualified components.
2. Safety Devices. Known hazards which cannot be eliminated
by design selection shall be reduced to a minimum by designing
appropriate safety devices into the system.
3. Warning Devices. In those instances where it becomes
impossible to preclude a known hazardous condition, appropriate
devices shall be employed for detection of the condition and
generation of an adequate warning signal.
4. Special Emergency Procedures. In those instances where
design considerations or use of safety and warning devices fail to
reduce the magnitude of a known or potential hazard to an acceptable level, special emergency procedures are provided. These
procedures identify the hazardous period time span, actions
required if such hazards occur, and special operating procedures

operation.
During cryogenics operations, procedures dealing with every
step of the operation are mandatory. The smallest task if not
correctly performed could cause an expensive failure to the system
or the product and jeopardize the lives of operating personnel.
Let me emphasize before going on to the next factor that
personnel are not, during reactor or cryogenics op~rations, treated
as being separate from the system. They arc part of the system
anJ function as a component. Human factors engineering is as

to reduce possibility of occurrence.
An example of each of thes~- would be:
1. If, during a reactor run there occurs a discontinuity of
coolant LH2 flow, damage could result to the reactor. A backup
system has been installed which will automatically continue
coolant flow should the flow from any primary coolant system be
reduced for any reason. This system operates completely automatically and separate from the main coolant system. The first level
of fail -safe redundancy should always be an automatic reaction,
not a manual one.
2. We have a rather unique device to make certain H2 systems
are completely independent of one another even though they share
a common line. It is known as a double block and bleed. In this
set up two block valves are installed, one downstream in the
common line and one upstream in the main discharge line of the
syslt'm bl'ing isolated. In the liquid hydrogen system gaseous
helium at a slightly higher pressure than the hydrogen is thl'n
injected into the line between the two valves. The pressure is then
monitored and occasional samples of the gas are taken to assure
no hydrogen seepage. In the gaseous hydrogen systems a bleed
lin<' between the two block valves bleeds off any leaking gas to

important in the overall dC'velopmC'nt of the system as reliability.
Factor 1 is probably the most important aspect ofthecryogenic
and system sagely program. The systC'm safety approach is somt'what different from that normally praC'ticed in industry. Systems
Safety involves applying scientific knowledge' and C'ngineering
principles for timely identification and l'limination or control of all
potential hazards within thC' systt'm. Tht' consideration of safl'tv
of the system starts with original conct'ptual studi!•s and follow:
through 'd esign, development, tt'sl, evaluation and opnation.
Ideally al the end you " ·ill have a system which is free of hazards
or in some cases, such as flight hardware', you have' pol controls
on the hazards which cannot operationally hl' l'liminatC'd.
:\ propnly functioning systC'ms safety program, not only in
cryogenics systems but in any syslC'm will accomplish the following:

the facility burn stack.

I . .-\dcquatt' !'Ontrols oYer known systems hazards which are
inherent to the system have bPcn C'stablishC'd lo protect pC'rsonnl'I,
equipment and property.
l. \tinimum risk is involvC'd in the acceptance' and usC' ofnC'\\
methods and 'or materials.
3. The rcquiremC'nt for retrofit actions (and their rC'sultant
costs) for safety reasons have been rliminated.
-t. \taximum safety, consistC'nt with opnational requirements,

;L \laming devices are installC'd at certain strategic places
throughout our IC'st complexes. These devices arC' of 11\"0 types.
One for combustible gas to indicate a hydrogen leak and onC' to
indiC'alc C'xccssivC' radiation. The hydrogen alarm is a siren, while
thl' radiation alarm is a klaxon. The reason for two different
audihlC' alarms is lo idC'ntify the type of emergl'ncy and the appropriate emergency action to be taken. These alarms not only sound
locally hut aetivatC' alarms in locations such as the c•f'ntral fire
station. Also during C'ertain tests, large' f'nclosC'd arC'as must be
inl'rtecl lo preclude an C'xplosion should a hydrog<'n leak occur.
PanC'ls equipped \\'ith alarms tell us when thl' oxygl'n <·onlenl in
thf'se areas becomf's C'XCC'ssivC' or when a hydrogen leak has

has been designC'd into the system.
\le try to categoriz!' eal'h hazardous condition which could
occur during a rC'aC'lor IC'st. Th!' c·atC'gorirs arc: safe, marginal,
critil'al . and catastrophic . .-\ systC'ms safety program emphasizC's
designing thl' syslC'm so if a malfunction oc·!·urs in onC' of thl'se
categories there is a backup system or procf'durc to c·ontrol or
eliminate' the malfunction. ,\ malfunc·tion should nrYcr c·ausc a
degradation of the system from one l'alrgory lo th<' nrxl more
serious category. Each systrm or subsysl!•m or c•omponcnl must
have one or more levels of fail -safe rcdundan<·y.
:\ gross hazard study is prrformed on l'ach system at the
NRDS. This study is a quantitative non-malhC'mali<·al ass!'ssmC'nt
of the safety features of the end it<·m. :\reas considned in this

occurred.
4. Emergency procedures exist for all f'mergencies which
<'ould occur at the NHDS. ThC'sC' range from a fire lo an acC'idental
criticality accident at a reactor. The. procedures are written simply
and to the point. In the case of accidC'ntal criticality or hydrogen
leaks the action to be takf'n is f'vacuation to a safe area.
As can be readily seen, safety in cryogenics and systems
takes on a wide variety of tasks to make' sure that all system.<; are
ready and safe during_ tl'sts. The techniques and procedures for

study include:
1. Isolation of energy source's.
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work-ing with large quantities of cryogenic materials at NRDS
reflect the respect for safety that must accompany association with
such materials.
Nuclear Safety
. ~uclear reactor and engine testing at the NRDS involves, in
add1t1on to many of the same safety problems that chemical rockets
have, the additional requirement that consideration be given to
nuclear criticality, direct radiation and reactor effluent.
Nuclear criticality safety involves the prevention of a nuclear
e)(cursion or accidental reactor startup during the handling of fuel
elements, assembly of reactor, pre-test checkout, test operations,
disassembly or post mortem .operations.
Direct radiation from a nuclear rocket reactor during full power
operation is significant (approximately 100 R/hr. at 2700 ft. for a
1000 MW reactor). This has, in the past been controlled entirely
by use of isolation. The control point i.s 2Yz miles from the reactor.
(Figure 1) In the future, with higher power reactors (up to 5000
megawatts thermal), direct radiation from the reactor during power
operation will be considerably reduced by a radiation shield around
the core. Future tests of engine systems will be accomplished from
a close-in, underground control room, providing personnel the
protection that distance has provided in the past.
Disassembly of a reactor after a test is accomplished to
evaluate the effects of test on structural integrity, and fuel element
erosion. Because of residual radioactivity in the reactor core due
to fission product inventory, the disassembly operations and post
mortem examinations are accomplished in a shielded building with
remotely operated manipulators.
Effluent in the form of radioactive particulate and gases is
produced by the reactor during power operations by diffusion and
corrosion processes. On-site and off-site radiation effects must be
considered.
Nuclear criticality safety is accomplished through the use of
administrative limits and written procedures for all operations
involving nuclear fuel material (U-235) plus physical control by
volume limiting and nuclear poisoned containers, quantity limited
· storage and transfer racks and multiple interlocking safety devices
on the reactor. As an example, criticality control of the assembled
reactor is accomplished through the use of electrical and mechanical locks on the control rods, through isolation of the reactor from
hydrogenous moderating material by double block and bleed
(previously discussed) on all hydrogen lines and through positive
isolation of the reactor from all water systems.
Radiation safety is handled through review, inspections and
audits to assure compliance of contractor procedures and activities
with AEC established dose levels. Radiation monitoring and
control is accomplished by the support services contractor, who
supplies the monitoring services required for all NRDS activities.
All personnel on the N RDS wear film badges from which we are
able to evaluate individual exposures.
We have an extensive effluent monitoring and evaluation
program on the NRDS. The major objective of this program is to
assure our capability for adequate prediction, measurement and
evaluation of potential or actual radiological hazards generated as
a result of reactor test operations at the NRDS. This capability is
necessary to assure that radiation, both on and off-site is mini mized, and that adequate documentation of radiation levels is

Air monitoring is accomplished by coll~cting air samples on
charcoal impregnated filters. For this we use portable battery
powered air sampling equipment. Filters are evaluated for iostopes
of iodine by use of radio chemical separation and analysis on a
gamma spectrometer.
. Fresh milk samples are collected from farms and dairies in
downwind sector following each test. These are also evaluated f~r
radioactive iodines by use of a gamma spectrometer. Computation
of isotope quantities is performed by use of a digital computer.
Many experiments related to the NRDS effluent program are
conducted by development contractors. Typical are experiments
such as fission product or exhaust stream monitoring.
Fission product release experim-ents conducted in the laboratory involve heating of fuel elements to determine their fission
product release characteristics as a function of temperature. The
data obtained is used in conjunction with a digital computer code to
"' obtain total release predictions for a particular reactor test. These
release predictions are used in conjunction with the diffusion
equa.tions and existing m:eteoroligical conditions, as previously
mentioned, to obtain the predictions for downwind radiation effects.
A further consideration in determining possible radiation
effects is the fission product inventory of the reactor. This .increases proportionately to the integrated power and is of maj~r
importance in this evaluation. In this respect the safety of a cold
clean reactor is best illustrated by results derived from a test that
was conducted at the NRDS in January 1965. This test involved a
standard 1000 MW reactor with special control devices to produce
a high speed insertion of reactivity and a ~orresponding reactor
excursion of maximum proportion. This was purposely designed to
produce a much greater effect than that which could be expected
from an accident involving a ground test reactor or engine under
any conceivable circumstance. The total fissions in this planned
excursion were a factor of two higher than any ·conceivable accident with a 5000 MW reactor system. Even with an excursion of
this magnitude there would be no exposure to personnel exceeding
AEC guide levels at distances beyond one mile from the test
location. (Figure 5) The possibility of a reactor excursion accidently occurring is infinitesimally small due to the use of multiple
criticality control systems and strict administrative control.
Con cl us ions
Reactor testing at the N RDS to date has not resulted in
radiation exposure to on-site or off-site personnel exceeding AEC
guide levels. However, we at SNPO-N, as well as our Users and
Contractors, have not been without our problems both radiologically and cryogenically. Fortunately however, none of our
incidents have been of a serious nature. We in Safety at the NRDS
have attempted to keep up with the giant strides which nuclear
technology has taken in recent months.
Safety, in a very technical sense, has by necessity played a
significant part in the growth and progress of the Nuclear Rocket
Development Station.
The new hybrid technology in practice at the NRDS presents
the key to future progress in space exploration without compromising the safety of those who work intimately with that technology.

accomplished.
Pre-run predictions of radiaoctive effluent transport and
diffusion are used as a criteria for final test approval. These
predictions are presently being made on the basis of weather
forecasts tailored for this application plus the use of diffusion
equations describing downwind dilution of reactor effluent. The
required weather forecast consists of the spatial and temporal
variations of the winds from the surface to approximately 15,000
ft. MSL, the temperature structure of the atmosphere through this
same layer and the probability of rain along the predicted trajec- ·
tory. This forecast provides the input required to predict the
behavior of the radioactive effluent. Dose predictions are determined for whole body external gamma, iodine inhalation and iodine
dose to the thyroid through the cow-milk chain.
Gamma monitoring is accomplished with remote readout
instrumentation at close-in locations and with thermoluminescent
dosimeters at distances out to 25 miles.
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